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Risk management plays a crucial role in the stakeholders’ decision making because it is directly 
related to safety, serviceability and economy. There is now a growing concern about how to 
relocate known risks into an acceptance threshold: this implies the evaluation of several options 
obtained from hazard scenarios considering the related consequences. In parallel, practitioners 
usually rely on standard tools for risk assessment, and on structural codes to compute 
performances. Although this approach is currently widely implemented, this research shows that 
hazardous situations can arise in properly designed infrastructures, due to errors in management. 
This paper deals with such issue, also highlighting a gap in current codes that could contribute to 
losses caused by unforeseen failure modes. In this study, a preliminary FMEA assessment was 
performed to identify the failure modes that required a deeper quantitative analysis. In a second 
step, a quantitative analysis was implemented, using a modular methodology that combines 
reliability theory with a risk-based approach. The results evidenced that a wider analysis focused 
on the identification of vulnerable areas shall be considered in every stage of the asset 
management. Furthermore, the dynamic of this process is regulated by the established safety level 
concerning possible damages to people, production sites and commercial activities.  
Keywords: Risk Analysis, Decision-making, Reliability Theory, Bridge failure, Flood Hazard, 
Hydrology, Bridge Management System, Probability, Infrastructure Management, Buoyancy. 
1 Introduction 
The management of the built environment is one 
of the most relevant present and future challenge 
for engineers. In particular, the safety and 
functionality of bridges plays a key-role on the 
mobility of people and goods. In this scenario, 
each bridge failure has direct and indirect 
economic consequences that might be relevant at 
both local and country scale [1]. Hence, is not 
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surprising that the scientific community revealed a 
growing interest in the analysis of past collapses. 
Lessons learned by these investigations, represent 
not only a pedagogic tool, but also the basis for 
future improvements of codes and standards [2]. 
A recent literature review on failures’ statistics 
confirmed that hydraulic-related failures 
dominates both in the overall mean and in the 
number of collapses per single event [2]. The 
concern, from a designer point of view, relies on 
current codes of practice. Hydraulic actions are 
not often properly accounted in standards, even 
though the worldwide scenario is rather 
fragmented. Several countries as USA and 
Australia specifically account for water actions on 
bridges, while the Eurocodes lack of an exhaustive 
formulation. In fact, the EN 1997 [3] provides 
some Limit States but mostly referred to 
geotechnical aspects, while hydraulic loads are 
considered only during construction. Although EN 
1991-1-6 gives few indications, the main issue is 
that it covers only the building phase, leaving to 
the designer the burden of establishing a proper 
hydraulic model and define some plausible limit 
states for the whole lifespan of the bridge. This is 
mainly related to buoyancy and dragging limit 
states, while the geotechnical assessment is better 
covered. Hence, at least in Europe, there is the 
need to properly address water actions on 
bridges. The scientific community developed 
reliability tools for the assessment of new Limit 
States (LS) to account for a failure mode that is 
not currently covered by standards. Reliability 
analysis is usually applied to measure structural 
performances. This because reliability theory 
underpins current codes and is used for the 
calibrations of safety levels [4]. Despite the 
existence of such advanced methods, there is a 
considerable gap between practitioners and 
academia [5]. Furthermore, the decision-making 
process is inevitably linked to economic aspects 
that cannot be explained by means of a reliability 
analysis [6]. Instead, risk indices are by definition 
performance indicators suitable to account for the 
economic consequences of a certain loss. From 
these considerations it is clear that in the light of 
future managements, reliability and risk analysis 
should always be coupled, to ensure a balance 
between safety levels and associated costs. The 
paper presents a framework that combines a 
reliability-based module with a risk-based 
approach. The methodology is illustrated in 
Section 2 and applied to a case-study in Section 3. 
2 Methodology 
The proposed framework is composed by two 
modules; the first is a reliability analysis applied to 
the hydraulic uplift action on a bridge deck. It uses 
the results obtained from visual inspections and a 
hazard simulation analysis. The second module 
involves the mitigation actions needed to reduce 
the risk, if is deemed unacceptable. The risk index 
is obtained in a decision-making context, 
evaluating each alternative based on its costs and 
time needed to be realized. The method is 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Flowchart of the method 
2.1 Reliability Module 
The safety level of the asset is evaluated using the 
methodology presented in Figure 2. Firstly, a 
visual inspection is carried out to define the 
system’s characteristics, according for example to 
the methodology proposed by Pucci et al., (2019) 
[7]. Then, a Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
(FMEA) is carried out to identify the possible 
failures of the system components and 
subcomponents. The behaviour of each element is 
qualitatively investigated regarding the same 
hazard. Then, a quantitative analysis is used for 
the most critical component according to its 
consequences in case of failure. 
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Figure 2. Reliability module flowchart 
In this study, the buoyant action is characterized 
by equation (1).  
G =  R –  S =  W  – P    (1) 
Where, Wdeck is the deck self-weight, and Pw is the 
hydrostatic uplift thrust against the deck. The 
stabilizing action, denoted with R, is computed 
using the geometric data obtained through the 
inspections. The variability of the data represents 
the source of uncertainty and is promptly 
considered. On the load side, the uplift action is 
evaluated using equation (2).  
P =  𝛾 ∙ 𝑏 ∙ 𝑎 ∙ 𝑥   (2) 
Where, γw is the water density, b, a and x are 
represented in Figure 3. In particular, x is the free 
board of the water flow set zero at the bridge’s 
intrados. On the action’ side the only probabilistic 
parameter is the river discharge (Q) that can be 
computed using an appropriate hydraulic model 
[8]. In the proposed analysis, for each return 
period of the action (TR), the variability of Q is 
accounted for. This means that the hydraulic 
model is computed ∀ tR ∈ TR = {2, 3, …, 200 years}. 
The computational burden results in 199 
simulations, and for each TR a maximization and a 
minimization of random parameters is carried out 
to generate the distribution of Q(TR). A significant 
increment of cost-effectiveness is obtained by 
reducing the number of simulations from 199 to 5 
by means of a logarithmic interpolation 
performed in the chart Q=Q(TR). The lowest and 
the highest return periods should be simulated in 
order to do not compute extrapolations. The beta 
index can be then evaluated for each TR using the 
First Order Reliability Method (FORM). This allows 
to probabilistically quantify the buoyancy of the 
bridge deck in the occurrences in which this 
analysis is relevant, i.e. supported girders. 
Although the analysis can be also performed by 
simplified methods [9], the buoyancy action is 
very sensitive to the bridge’s boundary conditions. 
In particular, the height of the riverbanks, the 
shape of the girder and the presence of new 
bridges might change dramatically the safety level. 
This issue is relevant as an original safe design 
against the buoyancy LS might become unsafe due 
to hydraulic works operated downstream or 
upstream the bridge. In such perspective, the 
manager should always perform a check through 
hands-on tools if the planned works are causing 
changes on safety levels within the portfolio of 
structures. The final step of this module is to 
check whether the reliability indices are deemed 
acceptable or not. The comparation is obtained 
using target reliability indicators provided in 
literature [10]. 
 
Figure 3. Scheme of the deck partially submerged 
2.2 Risk Module 
In the management of a bridge, it might happen at 
a certain point in the lifespan of the structure, 
that the reliability target for a certain LS cannot be 
met. In such scenario, the causes could be 
determined by many factors like design, 
construction error, or a management error; this 
paper focuses on the latter, highlighting the role 
of an unforeseen failure mode (i.e. buoyancy) 
caused by works alongside the river, as new 
embankments, bridges or dams. The 
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consequences on economy, society and 
environment due to a bridge failure can be 
assessed using a risk-based approach. Risk, and 
more specifically flood risk, is analysed through 
different formulations depending on the context 
to which is applied (e.g. social, technical, 
economic, environmental). A review on such 
metrics can be found in [11]. The common 
features of all definitions are: (i) the assessment of 
a probability and (ii) the loss estimation in case 
the event occurs. A rational approach in flood risk 
assessment is the so-called Source-Pathway-
Receptor framework [12]. Uncertainties 
propagates from the raw hydrometric data 
(source) to the civil infrastructures (receptors) 
through the watercourses (pathways). In the 
proposed framework, the reliability module 
already considers this chain of events. Hence, 
what is still missing is the consequences 
evaluation. This can be appraised if the considered 
area already suffered from inundations. An 
estimate of damages can be obtained from past 
events by linking the spatial pathway of the 
flooded area to the return period of the event. 
Then, a qualitative risk scale, e.g. Hicks scale, can 
be adopted for the preliminary evaluation of flood 
risk regarding the selected LS; i.e. buoyancy. If the 
risk is deemed acceptable, interventions should be 
performed to reduce either the probability of 
occurrence or the consequences. In case of 
buoyancy LS, several actions can be implemented 
using structural and non-structural 
countermeasures. After the evaluation of the 
costs associated to each alternative solution (e.g. 
new bridge or lowering the riverbed among 
others), the decision should be based also on 
criteria as the time needed to complete the works, 
the long-term costs of the decision alternative, the 
sensitivity of the manager to losses. Approaches 
of these criteria to the utility and cumulative 
prospective theories can be found in [13]. In the 
present work, the accent is stressed on the 
importance of urgent measures to mitigate the 
risk in case the safety requirements are not met 
for rather low hazard return periods (<< 100 
years). In this scenario, during the flood event, it is 
crucial to implement non-structural measures. An 
early warning system can be employed through 
the combination of a real-time monitoring of the 
river’s discharge and the use of the hydrograph 
obtained during the hazard simulations. Given the 
hydrograph in Figure 4, three discharges can be 
identified: Qc is the flow that corresponds to the 
beginning of the inundation, Qb is the discharge 
corresponding to the βtarget, i.e. the reliability 
threshold for the computed LS. Finally, QA is 
related to the time tA in which the Civil Protection 
alert should be raised. Hence, the minimum time 
needed to implement measures to mitigate the 
consequences of a flood is tc-tb. This early warning 
system is a temporary measure in case the risk 
level is deemed unacceptable and risk-control 
actions should be promptly taken. In such 
occurrence, the early warning cost should be 
accounted in the planned decision alternative. The 
risk associated to different options can be 
evaluated assuming as probability of occurrence 
the formula given in equation 3.  
P =  1 − 1 −
( )
   (3) 
Where, Ni is the time (in years) needed to 
complete the construction works related to the i-
th decision alternative. The decision-related risk is 
assessed according to equation 4.  
r = 𝑃 ∙ (€ + € )   (4) 
Where, €EW is the total cost of the early warning 
system for the planned time Ni, and €I is the direct 
cost of the i-th decision. A raking of all alternatives 
allows to determine the most convenient one in 
terms of construction costs, probability of 
exceedance of the selected LS during the works, 
and early warning system costs. The overall 
framework is demonstrated in the next section on 
a real case-study located in Tuscany (Italy). 
 
Figure 4. Hydrograph to aid early warning systems 
IABSE Conference – Risk Intelligence of Infrastructures 
November 9-10 2020, Seoul, Korea 
5 
3 Application 
The method is applied to a bridge located in via 
Menconi – via Giovan Pietro in Avenza, Italy. The 
bridge, presented in Figure 5 was built in 2007. 
The planned works involved the demolition and 
reconstruction of two bridges: the one in via 
Menconi and another 400m downstream located 
in via Covetta. The management of the two 
structures is held by the same public institution. 
 
Figure 5. Via Menconi - Via Giovan Pietro Bridge 
3.1 Reliability module 
An inspection campaign was performed on 2018 
and did not highlighted defects nor severe aging 
of the bridge [7]. The FMEA analysis, revealed that 
a possible buoyancy and dragging of the deck is 
not restrained, as the bearings only have 15mm 
shear studs against lateral actions. Hence, if the 
uplift thrust during a flood is great enough to lift 
the deck more than 15mm, then the deck can be 
washed away. A possible resulting failure in the 
chain of events is the obstruction of the water 
flow by the dragged deck. This will lead to the 
overtopping of embankments and a generalised 
inundation of the surrounding city, which is built 
in the river’s floodplain.  
3.1.1 Probabilistic characterization of the inputs 
The bridge deck, being not restrained for uplift 
actions, contrasts the Archimede’s thrust only 
through its self-weight. The distribution of the 
deck weight is based on the information obtained 
during the inspection campaign. On the contrary, 
the river’s discharge is probabilistically 
characterized through a distributed hydrologic 
model as the one developed by Castelli et al., 
2014 [8]. The model uncertainty is probabilistically 
considered and summarized in Table 1. 







TR (for Q) 
[years] 
Wdeck [ton] 231,9 10,8 - 
Q [m3/s] 100,3 2,5 2 
Q [m3/s] 302,5 3,0 30 
Q [m3/s] 340,7 3,2 50 
Q [m3/s] 392,4 3,3 100 
Q [m3/s] 444,2 3,5 200 
 
Before computing the reliability analysis, a proper 
hydraulic study should be performed, and is 
illustrated in the next section. 
3.1.2 Hydraulic modelling and buoyancy effect 
The modelling of the open-channel hydraulic is 
done using De Saint Venant equations, 
implemented in a commercial software. The 
analysed stretch of the watercourses goes 500m 
upstream the bridge until 1000m downstream it. 
The upper and lower limits were selected 
considering the presence of other hydraulic 
manufacts in the same river (e.g. the via Covetta 
bridge, located 400m downstream the analysed 
structure). This analysis, that in the specific case-
study was aided using the software HEC-RAS [14], 
reported an anomalous behaviour of the river 
flow, downstream the analysed bridge. It was 
observed a significant backwater effect due to the 
contemporary presence of the via Covetta bridge 
and a narrowing of the river’s cross section. This 
caused a significant increase on the free board of 
the water flow. The comparison in the absence 
and in presence of such obstacles is highlighted in 
Figure 6. It can be clearly seen that the backwater 
dramatically increases the uplift thrust just after 
the water’s free board reaches the via Menconi 
bridge intrados. The analysis is computed for TR 
ranging between 2 and 30 years, given an already 
buoyant deck at TR=30 years. 
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Figure 6. Water height value for different TR  
Thus, the bridge is exposed to an unforeseen limit 
state that should have been accounted during the 
rebuilding phase in 2007. The design choices in 
the via Covetta bridge aimed to respect the river’s 
width, maintaining the original 16m, while in the 
bridge of via Menconi, the cross section widen to 
19m, given the impossibility to increase the bridge 
clearance due to urbanistic constraints. Hence, the 
new structure costed 0.7 million Euro, although 
designed according to the existing codes, is not 
safe regarding the buoyancy of its deck. 
3.1.3 Reliability Index of buoyancy Limit State 
The probability of failure regarding the buoyancy 
Limit State, that is a global failure, is shown in 
Table 2. The results are compared to the target β 
index, that is chosen equal to 3.8 as a minimum 
safety level; it is indeed an unusual value for a 
bridge, since the design TR is usually 100 years. 
The critical condition is reached for TR= 25 years, 
as the definitive proof of inadequacy against uplift 
actions. 
Table 2. Reliability index for buoyancy LS 
TR 
[years] 




23 6,7 * 10-7 4,83 
24 6,6 * 10-5 3,8 
25 4,0 * 10-3 2,63 
 
3.2 Risk module 
The consequences of an inundation are estimated 
from historical data, as many floods occurred in 
the same area during the last two decades. The 
closest one concerning the outbreak point of the 
river resulted in 24 million Euro damages [15]. 
Thus, applying the Hicks scale, the risk is deemed 
unacceptable (Weight = 3, Consequences = 60; 
Risk = 3*60 > 100) and risk-mitigation measures 
should be taken. The associated costs were 
estimated using analogous works already planned 
or executed on the same river. The time needed is 
estimated using real Gantt diagrams. The early 
warning system is considered to be the same for 
all the three alternative decisions; hence, in this 
particular case, it is not included in the costs 
computation. From the analysis of the hydrograph 
for TR= 30 years in Figure 7, has been found that 
the minimum time to issue a short-notice warning 
is 15 minutes. 
 
Figure 7. Hydrograph for TR = 30 years 
3.3 Results and discussion 
The analysis revealed that a generalised 
inundation might occur for rather low return 
period of the hazard (∼ 30 years). Although the 
bridge was designed according to current 
standards, changes in the river’s geometry led to 
unexpected heighten of the water profile. This is 
the cause of the cited backwater effect. The 
performed reliability assessment was coupled to a 
qualitative risk acceptance criterion to decide 
whether actions are needed. Three options were 
found: (A1) demolition and rebuilding of the via 
Menconi bridge; (A2) demolition and rebuilding of 
the embankments downstream the bridge and 
widening of the river’s cross section; (A3) lowering 
of the riverbed, using a small trapezoidal section 
to limit the impact of such measure on the 
embankments. The costs associated to these 
options are: (A1) 0,56 million Euro; (A2) 2,1 million 
Euro; (A3) 1,2 million Euro. The Gantt diagrams 
led to the following durations: (A1) 6 months; (A2) 
1,5 years; (A3) 8 months. The latter is a less local 
intervention because is planned until the river’s 
outlet section; this justify the time needed for its 
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completion. The resulting risk pie chart is shown in 
Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8. Risk associated to the three alternatives 
Hence, it can be concluded that the best 
alternative is A1. Other criteria based on utility or 
cumulative prospective theory shall be further 
included. This will allow to search for the optimal 
risk-informed decision. In addition, indirect costs 
related to economic losses of commercial 
activities shall be included if option A1 is chosen, 
while A3 does not have such additional costs. 
Regarding the hazard simulation, the logarithmic 
interpolation performed on Q(TR) to reduce the 
number of simulations, not only improved the 
computational efficiency of the method, but 
revealed also a good coefficient of determination 
(R2=0.99), as displayed in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Discharge interpolation for different TR  
4 Conclusions 
The developed framework pointed out the need 
of better infrastructures management procedures, 
using tools as reliability and risk analysis. The 
preliminary qualitative analysis of failure modes 
highlighted the most relevant ones in relation to 
their expected consequences; the use of reliability 
analysis was decisive to quantify the severity of 
the failure in relation to the hazard return period. 
However, this has been made possible only 
because a local hydraulic analysis was also 
performed. Indeed, the responsible of the 
buoyancy was found to be the backwater effect. 
This was highlighted only from the simulations 
performed in HEC-RAS. The unforeseen failure 
mode was proven to be determinant for very low 
return periods (around 25 years); the analysis of 
expected consequences allowed to quantify the 
risk. Acceptance criteria were employed to decide 
the typology of interventions to be taken. 
Furthermore, the hydrograph used in the 
simulations was also used to quantify the early 
warning notice in terms of available time to 
evacuate the population from the floodable areas. 
Further investigations on decision criteria will help 
to optimize the choices helping the bridge 
manager. 
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